Criticisms

However, contextualist epistemology has been criticized by several philosophers. Contextualism is against to any accepted anatomy of Invariantism, which claims that ability is not context-sensitive (i.e. it is invariant). More contempo criticism has been in the anatomy of battling theories, including Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), mainly due to the plan of John Hawthorne (2004), and Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI), due to Jason Stanley (2005). SSI claims that it is the ambience of the accountable of the ability allegation that determines the epistemic standards, admitting Contextualism maintains it is the attributor. IRI, on the added hand, argues that it is the ambience of the applied interests of the accountable of the ability allegation that determines the epistemic standards. Stanley writes that bald IRI is "simply the affirmation that whether or not anyone knows that p may be bent in allotment by applied facts about the subject's environment."9 ("Contextualism" is a misnomer for either anatomy of Invariantism, back "Contextualism" a part of epistemologists is advised to be belted to a affirmation about the context-sensitivity of ability attributions (or the chat "knows"). Thus, any appearance which maintains that something added than ability attributions are context-sensitive is not, carefully speaking, a anatomy of Contextualism.) DeRose (2009) responds to contempo attacks on contextualism, and argues that contextualism is above to these contempo rivals.

An another to contextualism alleged contrastivism has been proposed by Jonathan Schaffer. Contrastivism, like contextualism, uses semantic approaches to accouterment the botheration of skepticism.10